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Preface
Felicity Colman
A woman builds a sandcastle on the foreshore of a beach. 
The tide encroaches gradually, at first waves lapping the 
moated edges of the structure gently; a kiss of foam and long 
thin strands of washed-up seaweed frond adorn the edges. A 
storm is building on the horizon, layering the sky with hues of 
green, purple, and black, and the wind shifts the dark green 
sea swell. A large wave takes the castle; atomizing its walls and 
rooms; dissolving the form. The woman leaves the beach just 
as large droplets of rain begin to fall on the smoothed down 
sand, erasing the last traces of the edifice. The waves increase 
in size and begin to wash up all manner of objects; dark green 
pandanas fronds, dead pale blue jellyfish, deflated orange 
lifejackets. 
The question of affect emerges in the daily realm of routine, 
and survival; of your physical and existential existence. No 
matter what the situation or condition in life, as observed, 
different systems (organisms, bodies, technologies, 
territories and the things within them) are reactive and 
generative, corruptible and powerful, colonisable and sub-
versive; that is to say, all systems are subject to affects as 
much as they are affective, and generative of positive and 
8 negative affects within and of a system. This proposition 
can be tested against whatever the degree of sentience or 
sensitivity that a system’s responsive domains or bodies 
may hold. The woman builds something, and another body 
destroys it. The rain comes, and ontic-forming conditions alter 
the topology. The light refraction changes our perception of 
something. This Spinozist principle of understanding—that 
every body has the capacity to be affected in positive and 
or negative ways—provides one of the core axioms for any 
affect ecology. But if affect is to be taken as more than an 
indicator of change—a barometer of the change of con-
ditions for a system (be it an organism, field, thing, etc.,)—
then how do we describe affect itself? How can the changes 
that the notions of affect seek to express be registered or 
measured? How can affect be situated by and generative of 
a system simultaneously? This question has long been the 
subject of Marie-Luise Angerer’s extensive research into and 
analysis of the conception of affect. 
The question of what affect is emerges within various 
studies in the scientific and the humanist disciplines. 
Encounters generate affects. Encounters between 
organisms and things external to them, or groups of things, 
further generate affects that may engage the singular 
and the multiple. This results in changes in situation or 
conditions, productive of new bodies; different in their 
attributes and constitution. New bodies generate different 
affects, and so on. These concerns have clustered variously 
across the differing disciplinary fields of thinking affect. 
They have formed specific discourses of affect; ontological 
and epistemologically grouped; linguistic, materialist, 
phenomenological, neurological; lived articulations of a 
phenomena that is broadly described as an affect, or an 
affective field. Broadly conceived, affect is expressed as 
either or both an ontological entity and an epistemological 
qualifier. A primary concern for studies of the affective 
field is the question of what happens, or what is produced 
through an encounter with other bodies; and according to 
disciplinary focus, this may be in terms of specific interests, 
9from consideration of the political body; the philosophical 
and the physiological; informatics and media affects; the 
notion of the affective plasticity of the brain, and the post­
human ethics of the body; the address of affective ped-
agogies and genealogies; to post­phenomenological consid-
erations of cultures; and consideration of material affects.
Angerer locates affect within and across such dynamic 
fields. Testing the field, she has extensively mapped out 
how the breadth of capacities of affect are teased into the 
domains of bodies, technologies, desires, and materials. 
While providing us with an overview of the orthodox points 
of differing affect theories, her own position arises from 
a critical examination of how the modality of antagonistic 
desire initiates intensive affects, which in turn provoke 
changes in the political domain, and its affective systems. 
This modal force, as we can find in every field, may come 
from infrastructural elements, or it may be generated 
when different systems (biologic, technologic, or social) are 
coupled to create new models for thinking. Arguing with 
Laclau, Marchart, Massumi, and others, Angerer guides her 
reader carefully through the nuances of Marchart’s call for 
an affectology; the formation of a model that would provide 
a framework for the critical analysis of the ecology of affect. 
Angerer’s work is novel in providing a systematic appraisal 
of the components of affectology, which she details as an 
unfolding model of intensity, situated by the notion of affect 
as a site and condition of politically determined desire. 
In our work in the critical fields of the sciences, arts, 
philosophy, technology, and information creation, desire 
is given its own ontological situation; it is a thinking of the 
field of affectology. These are the cluster of discourses that 
articulate the political conditions of a time; the passions 
of rulers and despots; the indignities of their subjects; the 
abuses of power of one group of passionate people over 
another; the hunger of certain species; the cellular redesign 
of one viral group consuming another. Articulated in terms 
of disciplinary coding, then the terms of “desire” are named: 
10 enzymes, attractors, and through these terms the modes 
of its behaviors are expressed. In desiring, we acknowledge 
a power, and we seek to engage with that desire. We are 
repelled, redirected, and reorganized, reformed, remade. 
A life-jacket washes up on the empty beach. In desiring, we 
articulate a field. The desire may not have a name or form; 
it may simmer or simper underneath the banality of the 
everyday, or the disguises of its rendering of routine into 
something else. Desire radiates a power that may require 
proximity, thought, imagination, utility, or economics to 
intersect, to join or to decouple. In joining it becomes 
parasitic; an ivy strangulation or supportive framework that 
continues long after its host has withered and faded away; 
a power that makes and destroys in its reforming and its 
un-forming. Desire is what motivates lives, minor quests 
of becoming; being beings in the world, which collectively, 
makes for impact upon the use of environments in order to 
join or pursue desire. 
As Angerer’s work shows, with the model of ecology of 
affect, the epistemological field of desire is made visible, 
and we come to know what we already have sensed or 
experienced. The technological power developed in the 
twentieth century reconfigured the modal operations of 
human societies, and with them, their environments. The 
field of affect reaches towards the articulation of an event, 
but it is not the event itself. The very definition of affect 
strains as far away as possible from a scientific­analytic 
pinpointing of matter and its formation by a specific time­
system into a modelled affect.
The industrial production of all aspects of life, as engaged 
by the capitalist model, is generative of a breadth of 
affective states, which we can express as entropic, antag-
onistic, machinic, and so on. This model is just one of many 
that we use in order for a modal thought, or action to be 
articulated. A model arises, as a collective, intuited, or 
determined response to a new body, or event. Identified or 
expressed in a way that marks it as different to what has 
11come before, this sense is named, often in a prehensive way, 
as a response to events, actions, ideas. Finding a model that 
expresses this difference as an apprehension involves the 
capture of something; a claiming of sense. This colonisation 
of difference may produce positive as well as negative 
affects. The articulation of a new model is not just limited 
to a cognitive perception of something, but can be formed 
by an intuited sense, or what is described as preperceptual. 
In philosophy, modelling is referred to as procedural, in 
cultural studies ideological, in affect studies it can be con-
tingent, and intensive. 
What affect theories describe for us, as Marie­Luise Angerer 
explores in Ecology of Affect are the modalities of powers at 
work; power as desire, as politics, and what we do express 
in terms of their particular affectology. The range of modal 
iterations of affect each have come to constitute specific 
fields of affect studies—in philosophy, psychology, gender, 
or in media studies, and so on, and collectively Angerer 
positions them as identifiable models within an affect 
ecology. As this book iterates, the modalities enabling 
expressions of various relation­fields of affect are what 
define and draw attention to the circumstances affecting 
their ontic-epistemic conditions. These conditions, as 
Angerer describes them, consist of three operations of the 
affective—as connective, disruptive, and translative; as 
the temporally barred momentum of a relation, a blank, a 
gaping opening, into which and from affect arises.
What happens to desire, after affect? is the question of sur-
vival that Angerer raises earlier in her thinking of this model; 
rephrasing the desire that arises through competitive 
prowess, as a motivating affect­inducing contest of desires, 
which can in fact be articulated as a “desire for disaffection” 
(Angerer 2014, 130). Desire for the rain to come; to dispel the 
heat and dust of the day. Locating the conditional state of 
disaffection in that site between the interval that humanistic 
theory and theology variously refers to as “God,” “nature,” 
the interval, the liminal, the beyond or an intangible 
12 situation, as in fact being measurable by a temporal 
marking; “the elusive half­second,” then the modality of 
one’s prehension of an affective state can be situated. The 
temporal situation of affect can be articulated by this modal 
framework; as material (the terms of its being, such as in 
the lack or presence, or intensity, temperature, or velocity of 
the rain); perhaps as logical (the solidity of some materials 
over others, in certain conditions); perhaps as semantic 
(the “symbolic” aspect of language expressed affectively to 
territorialize a political position). 
These are all affects that are not of one’s own choosing, and 
as Angerer’s apprehension of the various positions of affect 
articulates, affection is not a situation that can be predicted. 
It is not a state of intentionality. Thus a contingency must 
be factored into any modal account of an affect ecology 
as model. We tend to name models after we can point to a 
constellation of events and ideas by which we might express 
their sense. If we take affect as the model, then, as Angerer 
demonstrates in this text, the modalities for thinking it are 
infinite; but what Angerer points to is how the model of 
affect is in fact defined by the modes of intensity a model 
engages, but also forms of technology—as platforms, as 
apparatus, as physical, chemical, biological, imaginative, 
speculative, logical tools—that enable the expression of 
that model. This is the what of conditionality (as Simondon 
describes), and the there is (that Althusser identifies); the 
present tense (that Angerer identifies), in modalities of 
materiality, feasibility, logicality, and so on, by which the 
elements that comprise a given ecology of affect may be 
discerned.1 
Affect belongs to the range of modalities that are used in 
order to express conditions of change in the world; and in 
consciousness of worlds. It can be, as Angerer describes 
in her work, something that is employed in an orthodox 
manner; as an adjective for registering change, movement, 
or perception, or something applied as a noun to define a 
1 Hans Poser defines a range of modal positions (cf. Poser 2013).
13whole new realm of thinking. The role of affect is to thus 
assist in articulating the conditions of a political community, 
and define its actions in terms of the political domains it 
enables. 
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Indication of the 
Contemporary
As we think, we live. 
– Alfred N. Whitehead
As he was working on his novel Satin Island (2015), Tom 
McCarthy writes, he shamelessly pilfered from recent 
theory to create his protagonist, U., an ethnographer of 
the contemporary. A corporation with global operations 
has hired U. to compile a sort of mega-report on what is 
happening here and now; his survey of what is beginning to 
change at this very moment, his clients hope, will allow them 
to get a grip on the incipient transformation. In other words, 
his mission is to (re)count life in the rhythm of its aliveness. 
U. begins by observing himself, the people around him, 
at airports, in the streets, his office, his desk, the tidy 
arrangement of the things on it, and waits for the moment 
when, finally, he will start writing—until he suddenly 
realizes, or believes he realizes, that it is all one great plan, 
a drafting table, an encompassing structure, comparable 
to what Claude Lévi-Strauss had discovered among his 
16 indigenous people. Very much a scientist of his time, U. 
imagines how, in one of his next public appearances, he will 
present his new idea before an enormous auditorium:
Then the Great Report would not be something 
that was either to-come or completed, in-the-past: 
it would be all now. Present­tense­anthropology; 
anthropology as way-of-life. That was it: Present-Tense 
Anthropology™; anthropology that bathed in presence, 
and in nowness—bathed in it as in a deep, bubbling and 
nymph­saturated well. (McCarthy 2015, 78)
In the following pages I will undertake a similar attempt to 
capture the present tense. Instead of focusing on the figure 
of the anthropos, however, I will seek to displace his hegem-
onic perspective. The great plan U. believes he can discern, I 
would argue, is not being woven by humans (alone): it is the 
work of Humans and Others (cf. Angerer and Harasser 2011).
In an essay on Michel Foucault, written on occasion of the 
twentieth anniversary of Foucault’s Order of Things ([1966] 
1970), Gilles Deleuze draws attention to a potential fallacy 
in the famous study. The disappearance of (modern) man, 
his new formation, and the emergence of new relations 
between forces: Foucault associated these with language, 
whose great play, he argued, might be recovered in lit-
erature—in a literature that will have broken free of the 
human being and allied itself with new forces of an out-
side (of man) (cf. Deleuze 1999, 74–75). Yet, as Deleuze 
emphasizes, Foucault credited neither labor nor life—his 
other two major fields of study—to this power, instead 
entrusting it solely to language and especially to its lit-
erature (uncoupled from linguistics). In response to its 
incipient flattening reification in the study of language(s) in 
the nineteenth century, Foucault wrote, language developed 
a countervailing tendency, a collection or ingathering of 
itself that let it assert, beyond what it signified and meant, 
beyond even its sounds themselves, a being of language. 
What Foucault failed to see, Deleuze stresses, is that biology 
and labor had to undergo a similar uncoupling so they could 
17attain a new self-contained and consolidated reality in the 
genetic code (molecular biology) and in cybernetic and infor-
mational machines (labor of the third kind), respectively (cf. 
74). Deleuze himself is attuned to the signs of the times—
the rise of biology, and more particularly of molecular 
biology, and the advent of the cyber era—although, as Paul 
Rabinow’s Anthropology of Reason (1996) notes, whether he 
“correctly [grasps] the significance of these new practices 
remains to be seen” (92–93). Rabinow for his part stresses 
that the contemporary refraction of language, life, and labor 
makes it imperative that we address (or return to) the ques-
tion of the anthropos, the human.
As Rabinow writes, we are witnessing a reformulation 
of the human (cf. 93) that will recast the interrelation 
between language (representation and medium) and the 
world (matter and technology). Since the mid­twentieth 
century, that interrelation has come to be marked by 
conspicuous shifts that have begun to effect profound 
changes to language and the material and now thoroughly 
technologized world.
On the one hand, language is no longer the uncontested 
unique characteristic and distinguishing criterion it was. 
Language in its performative dimension, as a way of doing, 
a mode of action, finds itself confronted with other agents 
and strategies of agency, an observation Bruno Latour has 
recently detailed compellingly in his writings on networks 
and actors (cf. 2005). This development strikes at the heart 
of Martin Heidegger’s effort to think the human not as a 
civilized animal but as a being in and through language 
(cf. 1977). It also cuts to the quick of Jacques Derrida’s 
insistence, in his debate with John Searle, on iteration and 
the iterability of language as a momentum of non-identity, 
with which he meant to highlight once more the constitutive 
deferral of the speaking subject, its always already being 
spoken by language (cf. Derrida 1988). When this con-
ception of the human threatens to become brittle to its very 
core; when new conceptual frameworks favor a different 
18 perspective on the matters of life, on life as such; when 
language as a symbolic order implodes: then the question of 
the human, though it does not necessarily become obsolete, 
must surely be approached from a different angle.
On the other hand, this fraying of the boundaries of 
language corresponds to a process in which nature 
and technology leak, spill over, blend into each other. A 
number of neologisms—NatureCulture (Donna Haraway), 
MediaNature (myself), Media natures ( Jussi Parikka), entangled 
ontology (Karen Barad)—have been proposed to highlight 
the changing relationship between these two domains, 
whose repercussions and implications have also long begun 
to inform debates over the new knowledge formations.
In the past several decades, these developments have 
prompted a growing chorus of theorists to call for a 
different way of narrating our being­in­the­world. As 
Isabelle Stengers has put it, “these other narratives are 
needed because the great NBIC convergence—the con-
vergence between Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Infor-
mation Technology and Cognitive Science … is not about 
understanding but about transforming.” (2011, 371) How, 
then, can we narrate these transformative processes in 
the here and now? How can we bring into focus what is 
often labeled, with a blanket term that signals intellec-
tual impuissance, the “post­human era”? McCarthy has his 
ethnographer champion the concept of the contemporary, 
borrowing from Rabinow, who uses it as an umbrella term 
for the radical transformations that have eroded the def-
inition of the human. For some time now, biotechnologies 
have cast stark shadows into the future, adumbrating a 
dramatic realignment of distinctions that for the longest 
time seemed obvious: nature and culture, the non-human 
and the human. We must take Bernhard Waldenfels’s 
account of an unfettered “technology as quasi-nature” 
(2002, 364) at its word—the distinction Jürgen Habermas 
continues to maintain between a human nature and another 
nature external to the human may rightly be regarded as 
19obsolete (cf. 2003, 40). In his critique of Habermas, Rabinow 
accordingly spells out what, to his mind, is presumably one 
central challenge today: we must identify, or devise, a way 
of life “that does not make a sharp and brutal separation 
between what used to be called nature and culture” (2009, 
25).
complex relations
techno-sensation
intensive milieus
plasticity
affective non-conscious
bio-media threshold
post-human intra-actions
co-shaping
co-habitation
micro-ontologies
entangled ontologies
worlding
mattering
wondering
These terms—I might list others—have cropped up in 
recent years in connection with attempts, primarily in Media 
Studies and neighboring disciplines, to get a handle on the 
looming micro- and macro-level changes in the domains of 
life, the social, the political, the psychological, the organic, 
and, perhaps first and foremost, in media technology itself. 
In themselves, such a terminological revolution and reas-
sessment of accepted ideas is nothing new (on the contrary, 
it is a phenomenon familiar to academics): new discoveries 
20 inevitably entail new concepts and new perspectives, and 
terms often take on metaphorical meanings and enter the 
vernacular of disciplines far beyond the ones in which they 
were originally coined, as is amply illustrated by the turns of 
the last few decades—from the performative turn across the 
turn to things and the design turn to the pictorial turn. But the 
talk of such turns often obscures rather than indicates what 
is actually at stake.
Moving within these knowledge-generating environments 
called universities, you are compelled (and an inaugural 
lecture1 is a welcome opportunity) to review your own 
evolution and its stages; to reread your writings and revisit 
your past preoccupations with a critical eye and place 
them in their proper contexts; to examine to which extent 
you are a product of your time, an effect of a knowledge 
apparatus that determines—or more precisely, in which it 
is determined—what and how one must think today. Even 
if you do not adhere to this or that turn, you cannot avoid 
a certain jargon, nor should you—it signals that you are on 
top of things and keep current on debates over the present 
moment in the humanities, in Cultural and Media Studies.
Still, there is no denying that such self­revision affects 
the continuity of your own questions: your personal 
epistemological interests take on a new shade, different 
nuances come to the fore, perspectives change. What 
remains, however, is the continuity of your conceptual 
endeavors, a labor that raises the question not only of what 
concepts mean but also what is done with them, how they 
are constitutive conditions of thinking, the thinking of our 
time—expanding, but also limiting its purview, diminishing 
it, but also lending it its density.
1 I delivered my first inaugural lecture in 2001, at the Academy of Media 
Arts Cologne. It was entitled What to Do, How to Know, and Why to 
See, and in today’s perspective, I would say it pursued a relational—
another term would be intra-active-conception of gender and media. 
On “intra­activity” see p. 37.
21To paint in very broad strokes, we can identify two opposing 
camps in contemporary thought. One erects an impen-
etrable wall between subject and object: Speculative 
Realism is defined by its rejection of correlations of any 
kind between the subject of perception and cognition and 
the objects of its environment, of reality. Reality is. But 
what and how it is—these are independent of, and utterly 
unaffected by, what is called the subject. The world does not 
need the human being in order to exist, as the spokesman of 
radical anti-correlationism Quentin Meillassoux emphasizes 
(cf. Meillassoux, Dolphijn, and van der Tuin 2012). On the 
other side, we can make out—again, with considerable 
generalization—an enlargement of the purview of what 
is called life: growth, change, development, adaptation, 
sentience, and suffering, these have become (virtually) 
universal traits. “Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, 
yearns and remembers,” (Barad, Dolphijn, and van der Tuin 
2012, 48) as Karen Barad has put it. What would have been 
dismissed out of hand as pure anthropomorphism not too 
long ago is now in vogue as a critical objection to conceptual 
anthropocentrism. The question, then, is: what has changed 
in order for it to be plausible (again) to say, without fur-
ther qualification, that the world around us “feels,” that it is 
“sentient”?
A thinking in process, the very nature of thinking-as-process, 
can serve as a first bridge. In light of the shifts I have 
sketched, theorists have called not merely for a thinking 
of relations but for a thinking as relation of the sort Alfred 
North Whitehead, Gilbert Simondon, and others delineated 
(cf. Whitehead 1938; Simondon 2012; Combes 2012). It is thus 
also no coincidence that the intellectual endeavors that 
produced a relational epistemology, a relational ontology 
and even cosmology in the first half of the twentieth century 
are being rediscovered today. (In addition to Whitehead’s 
and Simondon’s, Ernst Cassirer’s and Jakob von Uexküll’s 
names figure prominently in this regard.) Today’s thinkers 
not only apply these earlier attempts, sometimes with 
exuberant enthusiasm, to contemporary developments and, 
22 what is especially significant for our context, introduce them 
into discourses of media technology: in their quest for an 
innovative conception of the interrelations between man, 
environment, technology, animal, and materiality, they also 
read earlier as well as recent accounts of anthropological 
and ethnological findings, as though they were first­person 
narratives or devotional literature.
The European network New Materialism: How Matter 
Comes to Matter, which I joined as one of the German 
representatives in 2014, is a good example. Its work is prem-
ised on the hypothesis that “situatedness, relationality, and 
affinity” are among the most fundamental parameters of 
theory and politics today, and that one of our most pressing 
tasks is to develop and establish new relations.2 In pursuit of 
this mission, the network’s members work on launching new 
collaborative ventures that will raise questions across dis-
ciplinary and national boundaries. In this perspective a New 
Materialism is conceived as a re-reading, a fresh perspective 
on and novel approach to issues that, in the twentieth 
century, were often considered solely under the primacy of 
the linguistic (symbolic).
2 See “COST—European Cooperation in Science and New Materialism: 
Networking European Scholarship on ‘How Matter Comes to Matter.’“ 
Accessed December 18, 2016, http://newmaterialism.eu/.
Force of Matter
Another scene:
In 1872, the professor of physiology, permanent secretary 
of the Prussian Academy, and rector of Berlin University 
Emil Heinrich Du Bois­Reymond traveled to Leipzig for 
the assembly of the Society of German Natural Scientists 
and Physicians. On August 14, he delivered a lecture in 
which he declared that there were at least two barriers 
insurmountable to human inquisitiveness:
With regard to the mysteries of the world of bodies, 
the natural scientist has long grown accustomed to 
pronouncing, with manly renunciation, his ‘ignoramus.’ 
Looking back on the course [science has] victoriously 
completed, he is sustained by the tacit awareness 
that, where now he does not know, he at least might 
know if circumstances permitted, and perhaps one 
day will know. Faced, however, with the mysteries of 
what matter and force are and how they are capable 
of thought, he must resolve once and for all resolve 
to accept a verdict that is much harder to pronounce: 
‘Ignorabimus.’ (1912, 441–42)
24 Those two barriers to human insight, the physiologist 
argued, were the nature of matter and the subjective 
qualities of sentience and their material reduction. How do 
we know something, who perceives, who or what senses, 
and how or where does that sensation come into being? 
These are all questions that continue to occupy us today, 
though in a new context: in light of a New Materialism in 
Media and Cultural Studies (which undertakes a critical 
reflection on twentieth­century developments in the natural 
sciences as well as computing technology, quantum physics, 
and cybernetics), and in light, too, of a radical object­
orientation and rigorous critique of anthropocentrism 
concomitant with the comprehensive cyberneticization that 
has long begun to re-organize the social, with far-reaching 
consequences. Some relevant keywords are social media, 
quantified self­movement, gamification, surveillance, and 
wearable technologies.
(Media) technologies are the driving forces behind 
these social, political, and theoretical shifts. Too often, 
however, they are studied only implicitly or without an 
adequate understanding of their complexities, and their 
fundamental significance—their active role in promoting a 
comprehensive relationality by setting and correlating the 
rhythms of large and small units and inward and outward 
sensations—has not been fully appreciated by theoretical 
efforts that frequently remain one­sided.
In our context, as for Du Bois-Reymond, matter and force 
are the decisive vectors, though the challenge they present 
is now primarily one of media theory. Unlike the nineteenth 
century mode of thought, they are no longer considered 
through the perspective of the human being, which is to say, 
through the lens of anthropological difference, but instead 
in a perspective focussed on processes of synthesis and 
organization constituted by media: they are conceived, quite 
generally, as interrelations between media technologies, 
environment, and body, between technology and culture 
(cf. Vagt 2016, 20). What we call human being, nature, and 
25technology are then no longer regarded as pre-existent but 
are instead understood to be engendered and shaped by 
these interactions: they are emergent phenomena. So what 
reality is is not, pace the Speculative Realists, unknowable: 
it has become, first and foremost, a question of the 
technologies that constitute reality in its biological, physical, 
affective, and psychological dimensions.
This insight has led George Dyson to argue that the primary 
obstacle today is the insufficient imaginative capacity of our 
brains, which makes it difficult for us to grasp the fact that 
the digital universe has long been more than a metaphor: 
it is a physical reality. He accordingly calls not only for a 
biological redefinition of technology of the kind outlined 
by Georges Canguilhem in the 1940s,1 but also highlights 
the urgent need for a cosmological conception of the 
technological world:
People treat the digital universe as some sort of 
metaphor, just a cute word for all these products. The 
universe of Apple, the universe of Google, the uni-
verse of Facebook, that these collectively constitute 
the digital universe, and we can only see it in human 
terms and what does this do for us? … We’re missing 
a tremendous opportunity. We’re asleep at the switch 
because it ’s not a metaphor. In 1945 we actually did 
create a new universe. This is a universe of numbers 
with a life of their own, that we only see in terms of 
what those numbers can do for us … If you cross the 
mirror in the other direction, there really is a universe 
of self-reproducing digital code. When I last checked, it 
was growing by five trillion bits per second. And that’s 
not just a metaphor for something else. It actually is. It ’s 
a physical reality. (Dyson 2012)
1 Canguilhem concluded his 1946–47 lecture series with a reference 
to the recent efforts undertaken at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) under the label “bionics” to study biological models and 
structures that might serve as models for technology (cf. 1992, 69).
26 A similar conception of reality is articulated by those 
analysts of contemporary media—from Donna Haraway 
and N. Katherine Hayles to Alexander Galloway and Eugene 
Thacker (cf. Haraway 1990; Hayles 1999; Galloway and 
Thacker 2007)—who emphasize that media technologies 
have ceased to be mere prostheses. This explains the con-
temporary tendency to conceive technology as ontology, as 
what pre-cedes any historical reality, be it political, social, or 
economic. Social and psychological processes alike are said 
to be conditioned by such onto-technological precedence 
(cf. Lash 2011).
Against this re-ontologization, I would like to give the debate 
a push in a different direction by bringing into play two ideas 
Ernesto Laclau has outlined: the concepts of constitutive 
antagonism and dislocation. I believe they allow us to con-
ceive of the relation between human and non-human as a 
moment of intra-active reversal, an intra-active inversion 
in which sensation, experience, and perception intersect, 
diverge, ally themselves, or also do not meet.
Affection is the hinge along which the articulation of the 
antagonism manifests itself and attains its rhythm. This 
is a rhythm that intervenes in what is called life in the 
technological and organic senses. Just as, toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, electrification metaphor-
ically encroached upon the mind and soul when tele-
graph lines were virtually identified with nerve pathways, 
media technologies play a major part in synthetic biology 
today—their “aliveness” serves as a model for processes 
of feedback or self-regulation. Historically speaking, 
comparisons between animals, machines, and human 
beings are nothing new; what is different now is that 
the criteria that served to draw unequivocal distinctions 
between machines and tools on the one hand and living 
organisms on the other have become so unstable that 
we have reason to speak of a new liaison established by 
the union of biotechnology and information technology. 
In this liaison, affect brings itself to bear as a process of 
27affection—in order to interlock, via technological time, with 
the originary deferral of life.2 The function of the affective 
is then to connect, disrupt, and/or invert life in time and 
technology as time in motion.
2 With allusion to Jacques Derrida’s concept of différance (cf. 1978).

Time in Motion
Another scene:
Hertha Sturm first made a name for herself in German­
speaking circles conducting research on the effects of 
media in the 1970s. In her empirical studies into media con-
sumption, Sturm discovered a “missing half-second.” As she 
demonstrated, the succession of images on television was 
too rapid, congruence between the audio and video tracks 
was too weak, and text or spoken language offered too 
little support for adequate processing of the overall infor-
mation. As a consequence, the children in her experiments 
were unable to make “correct” sense of the overabundance 
of information: their responses were too slow or too fast; 
they responded with pleasure to sad image sequences and 
with sadness to diverting films. Their changing moods were 
gauged by measuring their heart rate and perspiration. In 
other words, Sturm recorded a physical arousal curve that 
indicated, or more accurately speaking, from which she 
inferred, phases of elation or dejection—a slower physical 
arousal indicated a depressive basic mood, while a high 
rate conversely indicated elation. The ill-attuned moods 
she detected, Sturm argued, were a product of the “missing 
30 half-second,” the interval that elapsed between perception 
(signal, stimulus) and response—and it was impossible to 
determine what happened during this “lost time.”
Twenty years later, however, this “displaced”1 response 
resurfaces in Brian Massumi’s attempt to reframe affect 
in the terms of a theory of culture and helps instigate the 
affective turn within Cultural Studies and the theory of media 
and art. “The skin is faster than the word”—that is how, 
in the mid­1990s, Massumi outlines affect as an intensity 
that belongs to a different order: “intensity is embodied in 
purely autonomic reactions most directly manifested in the 
skin—at the surface of the body, at its interface with things.” 
(1996, 219) Although Massumi explicitly refers to Sturm’s 
“missing half­second,” (see Angerer 2011) unlike that interval, 
the temporal zone he portrays is no longer an empty lapse 
of time but brims with activity—it becomes a zone of affect, 
the moment of virtuality that makes actuality possible in 
the first “[P]astnesses opening onto a future, but with no 
present to speak of. For the present is lost with the missing 
half-second, passing too quickly to be perceived, too quickly, 
actually, to have happened.” (Massumi 1996, 224) The 
missing half-second has now turned into a duration in which 
too much takes place—the duration separating a “not-yet” 
from an “always-has-been.”
Yet this originary deferral or missing time has a long 
tradition in science, as Jimena Canales has demonstrated 
in her impressive study A Tenth of a Second (2009). She 
traces how, starting in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, experimental psychology, astronomy, physics, 
and measurement technology all sought to track down the 
mysterious gap; Sigmund Freud and Wilhelm Wundt joined 
the search party as well. Interest in measuring the temporal 
response, the personal equation or personal error, the 
individual duration that constitutes the subjective quality 
of sensations—already characterized by Du Bois-Reymond 
1 With allusion to Jacques Lacan’s description of affect as displaced like 
a ship’s unfastened cargo (cf. Angerer 2014, 58).
31as eluding material determination—then spread to nascent 
media arts such as chronophotography and cinematography 
that, in the century’s final three decades, experimented with 
technologies of recording and representation.
It all started with Hermann von Helmholtz, who, in 1850, 
conducted his first experiments with frogs in an effort to 
measure the time that passed between a stimulus to the 
animal’s legs and its response.2 Yet his measurements 
not only led Helmholtz do discover a lost time, he also 
quantified the delay of energy: a muscle’s potency, too, 
was unleashed in its entirety not at the instant of the 
momentary stimulus, “but largely only after [the stimulus] 
has ceased” (1850a, 283). In other words, time passed and 
energy was lost between stimulation and contraction—
not very much, but a distinctive quantity. What had been 
assumed to be perfect immediacy turned out to be “an 
interval, a time span, an equally circumscribed and empty 
period of time—an ‘in­between time,’ a temps perdu.” 
(Schmidgen 2009, 93) One of the most important champions 
of this lost time was Henri Bergson, who set interval and 
duration in relation to each other in his controversy with 
Albert Einstein, as evidence of the subjectivity of time as 
duration that necessarily escaped objective measurement 
(cf. 1978). That contention—Bergsonian duration—was the 
point the cybernetics debate of the 1940s seized upon. Via 
the concept of reflex, Norbert Wiener adapted a vitalist con-
ception of time as the gap between signal and movement to 
the machine, introducing the concept of duration, which, he 
wrote, applied to the human being and the machine alike:
Thus the modern automaton exists in the same sort 
of Bergsonian time as the living organism; and hence 
there is no reason in Bergson’s considerations why the 
essential mode of functioning of the living organism 
2 “I have found that a measurable time passes when the stimulus 
exerted by a momentary electric current on the hip plexus of a frog 
propagates itself to where the thigh nerve enters the calf muscle.” 
(Helmholtz 1850b, 71)
32 should not be the same as that of the automaton of this 
type. (1961, 44)
Max Bense returned to the same thought in 1951, asserting 
that the temporal interval was the basis for the commensur-
ability of machine and human being, the only difference 
being that computing machines, unlike humans, could 
take advantage of even the smallest interval. The inter-
val that, in the case of the human organism, presented 
itself as an open stretch of empty time was filled in by the 
cybernetic calculating machines with the speed with which 
they performed their assigned tasks, which defied human 
comprehension (a thought revived in our time by Wolfgang 
Ernst, Mark B. N. Hansen, and others, though they draw 
different conclusions from it (cf. Ernst 2014; Hansen 2014)): 
“Cybernetic machines exhaust the smallest interval. An 
addition takes place in one five­millionth of a second; ten 
million additions or subtractions of ten-digit numbers can 
be performed within five minutes.” (Bense 1998, 440) Yet 
Bense, too, explicitly associated this mechanistic operating 
capacity with Bergson’s duration and disassociated it 
from Newtonian time as an evenly elapsing continuum (cf. 
Rieger 2003, 146). But what does that mean when machine 
time and human time converge? When the speed of their 
operations may be the only thing that sets them apart? It 
means precisely this: that cybernetics conceived of duration 
and its subjectivity not in the Bergsonian sense but as 
an infinitesimal operation that would at some point fill 
in the interval. Deleuze, however, going back to Bergson, 
realized affect did not, and never would, fill in the interval; 
on the contrary, the interval was exactly the opening the 
human would need to defend as its last difference from 
the machine—in other words, it marked the very inversion 
in which the virtual “manifested” itself as positivity (see 
Bergson 1968; Deleuze 1989).
Sensitivity of Matter 
Another scene: 
In D’Alembert’s Dream ([1769] 1965), Denis Diderot, 
D’Alembert, and Mlle. L’Espinasse discuss the question of 
what might constitute the difference between a human 
being, an animal, a marble statue, and a clavichord, if 
development indeed begins with inanimate matter and 
passes through sentient existence to culminate in conscious 
thought (cf. 93). 
It is not a coincidence that Diderot has recently been redis-
covered as a vital source of inspiration in two different per-
spectives that place his thought at the center of a new nexus 
of questions. On the one hand, he is being reread with a 
view to the concern with living or biological technology, the 
general devolution (very much in the tradition of monistic 
naturalism) of sensing to technological nature; on the other 
hand, as Stengers notes, here is someone who forces the 
physicist (D’Alembert) to take practice seriously, to look 
hard at what happens and where and how, instead of 
shoehorning everything into tenets accepted on faith, be 
they epistemological or ontological. The little word merely, 
Stengers emphasizes, merits particular scrutiny: pay 
34 attention to what it serves to eliminate—that is “merely” 
practice, or that is “mere” theory, or that is “mere” super-
stition or magic or ritual or … (cf. 2011, 373)
Diderot attributes sentience to everyone and everything 
and acknowledges no more than a difference of degree 
between humans and others:
We humans are instruments gifted with sensation and 
memory. Our senses are simply keys that are struck 
by the natural world around us, keys that often strike 
themselves—and this, according to my way of thinking, 
is all that would take place in a clavichord organized as 
you and I are organized. There is an impression that has 
its cause either inside or outside the instrument; from 
this impression a sensation is born … (1965, 101 (trans-
lation modified))
In other words, Diderot regards sentience as a fundamental 
quality, one that does not presuppose a self, which on the 
contrary supervenes later. The self, in Diderot, is one string 
among many that resonate in harmony and disharmony. 
Life as resonance, as vibration and melody: the passage 
anticipates the melodic life—principle of Uexküll, who 
resorted to a figurative application of the musical concepts 
of melody and harmony to describe the adequate perform-
ance of an organism in its environment:
Meaning in the natural score takes the place of 
harmony in the musical score, which works as a con-
junction or, more precisely put, a bridge in order to 
unify two natural factors with each other. For, as any 
bridge has its feet on both sides of the river, which it 
connects as point and counterpoint with each other, 
these are linked to each other in music through 
harmony and in Nature through the same meaning. 
(Uexküll 2010, 188–189) 
Yet Uexküll’s compositional theory of nature is also con-
sonant with Baruch de Spinoza’s conception of affect, 
something Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, though they 
35do not say so quite explicitly, pinpoint when they introduce 
Uexküll as a Spinozist, highlighting the figure of the 
ritournelle (refrain) as the connecting element.
Whenever there is transcoding, we can be sure that 
there is not a simple addition, but the constitution of a 
new plane, as of a surplus value. A melodic or rhythmic 
plane, surplus value of passage or bridging. The two 
cases, however, are never pure; they are in reality 
mixed (for example, the relation of the leaf, this time 
not to water in general but to rain). (2004, 346)
That rain will make another appearance at the very end of 
this essay. It is well known that Deleuze credits Spinoza with 
giving the body back to philosophers by teaching them how 
to think it—as nature: “one Nature for all bodies, one Nature 
for all individuals, a Nature that is itself an individual varying 
in an infinite number of ways.” (1988, 122) Yet here, too, Del-
euze steers the discussion toward the music and the rhythm 
that animates this immanence plan, which is structured by 
slowness and speed, by stillness and motion:
It is not just a matter of music but of how to live: it is by 
speed and slowness that one slips in among things, that 
one connects with something else. One never com-
mences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters 
in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms. (123)
The concept of resonance is making a striking renaissance 
these days; it is often employed as though it holds out the 
redemptive promise of a reconciliation between society 
and nature (see Rosa 2016; Altmeyer 2016).1 Resonance is 
also brought into play by thinkers whose interest in media 
technology finds articulation in questions concerning swarm 
formation, risk prediction, and surveillance strategies.
Another concept that is relevant in this connection is the 
idea of modulation Deleuze introduces in his Postscript 
1 Martin Altmeyer portrays an innate yearning for environmental 
resonance that finds expression in our constantly checking for text 
messages, Tweeting, Facebooking, etc (cf. 2016, 17).
36 on the Societies of Control ([1990] 1992), offering a twofold 
definition. It is deterritorializing liberation—the surfer’s 
riding the wave—as well as the lifelong self-modulation 
with which the worker-subject seeks to comply with late 
capitalism’s imperative of flexibility. Yet this modulations 
is already described in A Thousand Plateaus ([1972] 2004), 
where Deleuze and Guattari, referring to Gabriel Tarde and 
his conception of the monad, pinpoint an inversion between 
quantifiable motions (currents) and quali­characteristics 
that they identify as a form of mimesis:2
Beliefs and desires are the basis of every society, 
because they are flows and as such as ‘quantifiable’; 
they are veritable social Quantities, whereas sensations 
are qualitative and representations are simple 
resultants. Infinitesimal imitation, opposition, and 
invention are therefore like flow quanta marking a 
propagation, binarization, or conjugation of beliefs and 
desires. (241)
If, then, the self is not necessarily a prerequisite for 
sentience, the question that is increasingly urgent in light 
of the many other “selves”—cyborgs, para-humans, real 
humans, operating systems—becomes: does everyone and 
everything sense?
This question touches upon a basic interface between 
human, animal, and machine that Haraway’s Cyborg Man-
ifesto ([1985] 1990) had described as increasingly, and 
dangerously, permeable—but what does that mean in 
concrete terms? We may be able to get a clearer sense 
if we envision this permeable entanglement no longer 
as inter­action (human­machine interaction) but instead 
as intra-action, a term proposed by Karen Barad. It 
emphasizes the radical non-identity of two poles, which 
attain their respective (temporarily identitary) positions 
only in the process of an intra-action. Intra-action crosses 
2 For the current interest in the concept of mimesis see Borch and 
Stäheli 2008.
37the conventional notion of causality and poses a radical 
challenge to the metaphysics of an entity conceived as 
individuated:
The notion of intra-action is a key element … The 
neologism ‘intra­action’ signifies the mutual con-
stitution of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast 
to the usual ‘interaction,’ which assumes that there 
are separate individual agencies that precede their 
interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that 
distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge 
through, their intra­action. (Barad 2007, 33)
This radical and constitutive relationality concerns 
knowledge as well as being, language as well as nature. 
Matter, in Barad’s agential realism, does not have a 
fixed reality before meaning but comes to be fixed only 
in and through discursive-performative acts of demar-
cation. Building on Foucault, Barad stresses that meaning 
engenders itself as a material practice; neither a matter of 
language nor one of a subject, it must be understood as 
constant performativity, a “differential dance of intelligibility 
and unintelligibility.” (149) Similarly, knowledge, in this per-
spective, is not bound up with a subject; it is, Barad writes, 
a “matter of differential responsiveness … to what matters,” 
not a cognizance “from above or outside or even seeing 
from a prosthetically enhanced human body. Knowing is a 
matter of intra­action.” (149) 
The parallels between the encompassing conception of 
sentience Diderot articulates and Barad’s approach can be 
uncanny. Compare the passage in which Diderot broaches 
the question of egg and germ to Barad’s observation 
(quoted above) that nature and everything in it suffers 
and desires. Diderot wonders how the egg and the germ 
introduced into it are capable of developing life. Both are 
initially mere “insensitive mass”, but then heat and motion 
spur life into action:
38 At first there is a little dot that bobs about, then there 
is a thread that takes on color and grows larger, then 
there is flesh starting to form, then there is a beak, 
there are wing-tips, eyes and feet beginning to appear, 
a yellowish substance that divides to make the intes-
tines—at last there is a living thing. This creature 
moves, it stirs about, it makes a noise … At last the wall 
is broken, and the chick comes out. It walks, it flutters 
its wings, it feels irritations, it runs away, it comes back 
again, it makes a complaining sound, it feels pain, it 
shows affection, it has desires, it gets pleasure from 
this or that. It shows all the emotions that you show. 
(Diderot 1965, 102)
Can Barad’s intra-active approach and Diderot’s sentience 
also be compared to blind feeling as discussed in White-
head’s process philosophy?
Blind Feeling 
We can draw a line from the conceptions of Diderotian 
sentience and an intra-active world to that concept of blind 
feeling, which plays a fundamental part in Whitehead’s cos-
mology. In light of the developments in contemporary media 
technology, it has emerged as an especially appealing figure 
that lets us envision perception and sensation without con-
sciousness (cf. Manning and Massumi 2014; Shaviro 2012; 
Haraway 2008).
So Whitehead thinks of perception and sensation as 
divorced from the category of an intentionally acting sub-
ject. His philosophy characterizes the primitive form of 
physical experience as a blind feeling receiving, or received, 
“as felt elsewhere in another occasion and conformally 
appropriated as a subjective passion” (Whitehead 1978, 162). 
In this “theory of sensation,” the subject or, more properly, 
“superject” becomes the “purpose of the process originating 
the feelings” (222). The tradition of metaphysical theories of 
perception, Whitehead argues, is marred by fundamental 
misconceptions whose primary source is the privilege 
they accord to visual perception. “I see something, so I 
already simply perceive it,” that is the classical supposition. 
40 Whitehead objects that a process of abstraction must 
always already have preceded this seeing for the “feeling 
[to be] subjectively rooted in the immediacy of the present 
occasion: it is what the occasion feels for itself, as derived 
from the past and as merging into the future.” (163) His 
theory of sensation is based on the supposition that life, in a 
radical sense, means self-experience and consists in a com-
plex process of appropriation for which, in his early writings, 
he coins the term “prehension” (Whitehead 1938, 150). Each 
of these individual acts of self-experience is, with another 
term Whitehead introduces, an “occasion of experience” 
(150). They are, he writes, the “really real things” (150).
I emphasize this aspect because we can think sensation 
as defined by Whitehead in conjunction with the concept 
of affect sketched by Deleuze and, later, Massumi. Affect, 
too, has no presence: its temporal locus is forever between 
“always-already-past” and “not-yet,” it is never immediately 
sensed or given and always already abstracted: past and 
future are fused in it as the momentum of the here and now, 
an “occasion of experience” in its radical form.
Sensation, blind feeling—as affect, and affect transposed 
onto the missing half-second as duration—thus points us 
to a dimension of abstracted physicality that emerges as a 
subjective entity in the intervals of the brain, of cells and 
nerves; or as Whitehead puts it, a dimension that lets us 
define subjectivity as the zone of lost time, as “life … in the 
interstices of each living cell, and in the interstices of the 
brain” (1978, 105–106).
Intensive Milieus
In the early 1980s, Haraway positioned the human being 
between animal and machine. Her Cyborg Manifesto ([1985] 
1990) declared that, in an age in which the boundaries 
between natural and artificial organisms were becoming 
porous, hybrids had started to emerge: half animal and half 
human, half machine and half human—chimeras, cyborgs. 
Yet hybrids are neither characters from the future nor 
prototypes for science­fiction movies and computer games: 
they are, first and foremost, indicators of what is happening 
here and now. Today, there is no doubt that commonalities, 
differences of degree, and relations between man and 
other beings outweigh sharp distinctions, making us one 
species among other “significant others” (Haraway 2003). 
This also puts the spotlight on the body as a networked 
entity; no longer understood (as in the nineteenth and, 
to a degree, the twentieth centuries) as an autopoietic 
system exchanging nothing but energy with its environ-
ment, it comes into view as an information processor: a 
“biomediated­body” (Clough 2010).
In the early twenty­first century, the relations between 
bodies and external and internal environments are rewired 
42 by information technologies, physical data communicate 
with environmental data, neuronal signals control the 
temperatures of bodies and living environments, and the 
little sisters (the term Rosalind Picard, the godmother of 
affective computing, has coined for Siri and others in an 
effort to allay the fear of Big Data (cf. 2010)) have a growing 
role in organizing the routines of everyday life. Engineers 
are rushing to develop digital assistants, “new others” by 
our side, non-humans capable of judicious planning and 
sensitive action that will presumably surpass or supplant 
humans even in the one domain in which they were (still) 
distinct from machines: until the late twentieth century, 
affect and emotion were regarded as the dimension of 
human existence that could be neither calculated nor dis-
regarded. The algorithms of affective computing have long 
begun to intervene to link up man and machine in affective 
- which is to say psycho-cybernetic—ways. That does not 
portend the end of the human being—his physical and 
intellectual obsolescence, as the transhumanists like to 
claim—but it certainly points to a radical displacement of 
the human away from the position at the fictional center of 
humanism it had occupied for centuries, and so humans will 
(have to) organize new intensive milieus with non­, para­, or 
post-human others.1
In the following sections, I will sketch three such intensive 
milieus: one, the nascent new networks linking environ-
ment, technology, and the human being (mediated by 
sensing as the synthesis of “sensor” and “sensation”); 
two, circuits connecting the psychological domain with 
1 It is interesting to note that the emphatic invocation of new milieus 
now pops up in the most unexpected places in contemporary political 
discourse. To quote an example from Austria that was prompted by 
the country’s dramatic political split revealed by the 2016 presidential 
elections: “In reality, however, what is needed is the recreation of 
milieus. Only then can we rebuild a sustainable identification with 
constructive politics. And these milieus will be new, with their origins 
in the digital world. What is needed is active involvement in the 
shaping of life­worlds. For there is one thing the wrath of the right 
reveals: the yearning for community of some kind.” (Schalko 2016)
43algorithmic programming (psycho-technologies, affective 
computing); and three, a plastic­affective conception of the 
brain centered in an “emotional self“ (Malabou and Johnston 
2013) that constitutes the core of a non­conscious con-
ceived as thoroughly time-bound. Sensing, in other words, 
is the catchword for an interrogation of the technological 
relationship between body and environment, whereas 
affective computing stands for an affective­technological 
reorganization of the relationship between the individual 
and the social environment. The plasticity of the brain, 
finally, brings us to a third dimension, that of an emotional 
self emergent in self-affection and thereby engendering a 
correlative restructuring of the libidinal ecology (cf. Guattari 
1995).
Of Sensors and Other Sentient Faculties 
In Desire after Affect ([2007] 2014), I examined the sub-
stitution of a psychoanalytical concept of desire by various 
traditions of the conception of affect, and proposed that this 
displacement has far-reaching consequences for a thinking 
of the human. By way of example, I quoted from Luciana 
Parisi’s Abstract Sex (2004), which may be read as a first 
stage in the evolution of a desire no longer conceived as a 
psychological dimension. Parisi instead describes it as an 
energy, the force that drives a sort of affective contagion. 
She fleshes out the concept of this contagion further in an 
essay on the Technoecologies of Sensation (2009) applying 
it, by way of an “extension of feeling,” to an environment 
replete with technology. This transposition turns desire both 
into a kind of vital force (comparable to Spinoza’s conatus) 
and into a sensation that is prima facie comparable to the 
sentient faculty discussed by Diderot.
Yet it also quickly becomes clear that what she describes 
are primarily the autonomous operations of agents such 
as bacteria, viruses, cells as they act, react, and exchange 
information, as described by Myra Hird’s theory of 
44 micro-ontologies. Chemical mechanisms such as quorum 
sensing,2 biofilm formation, and sporulation allow bacteria 
to be in constant communication and exchange information: 
“Bacterial communities … perform collective sensing, dis-
tributed information processing, and gene-regulation of 
individual bacteria by the group.” (Hird 2009, 42–44) Hird, 
who directs the genera Research Group, has adapted 
Haraway’s concept of companion species to the idea of co-
evolution and co-enactment among non-species in order to 
demonstrate that bodies operate in intra-active fashion on 
a cellular level in both genetic and morphological terms. Her 
micro-ontology takes a radically asymmetrical approach: 
its basic assumption is that the biosphere does not need 
humans to survive, while humans conversely depend on the 
biosphere.
If this autonomous life constitutes one basic element of 
Parisi’s techno-ecology, so does Whitehead’s concept of 
prehension, which Hird harnesses in an effort to outline an 
affective thinking that comprehends “the non­reversible and 
yet dynamic conditions of the being of the sensible and of 
the intelligible” (2014, 164). Prehension, she argues, makes it 
possible to understand computation and cognition as open 
and reversible rule systems,
not only because they are responsive to the physical 
environment which they seek to simulate, but more 
importantly because their discrete operations become 
infected and changed by informational random-
ness. The apparent opposition between affect and 
computation is here dissolved to reveal that dynamic 
automation is central to the capitalization of intelligible 
functions. (184)
2 Quorum sensing denotes the ability of unicellular organisms to employ 
chemical communication to measure the cellular density of their 
population. It allows cells in a suspension to activate specific genes 
only when cellular density exceeds or falls below certain thresholds. 
See „Quorum sensing,“ Wikipedia, last modified August 11, 2016, 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quorum_sensing.
45Media, in this perspective, become “prehensive machines 
of the unarticulable and unrepresentable,” (Parisi and 
Hörl 2013, 39) allowing for a rewiring that connects any 
movement of technical and living organisms to all levels. But 
then the conclusion is impossible to avoid that the epithet 
“affective”—used without further clarification—is the 
wild card that lets Parisi leapfrog at will between visceral, 
biological, technical, and mental processes. Data become 
“affective data” (39), but nothing is said about what sort 
of difference the attribute makes. The same goes for the 
abrupt switch to sentience. A “technology of sensation” (40), 
in Parisi, simply means that energy is translated into infor-
mation. But then no further reflection is expended on this 
crucial transmutation.
The study of the Media of Nature offers a slightly different 
picture. As Gabriele Gramelsberger writes in a contribution 
on the “rheology of media”: what circulates in them “is 
slimy, it lives, it thinks” (2016). She turns the spotlight on 
the “primordial slime of life,” not only because it evinces 
characteristics that make life possible, but because, as 
Gramelsberger writes, “technical media would not be 
possible without slime either … For slime … is not only 
the beginning of the emergence of man, it is the end of 
engineering and the future of technology” (167). Step 
by step, her essay charts a critical engagement with the 
matter of slime, one I would recommend as a model for any 
empirical-materialist approach to the study of media that 
aspires to think materiality afresh and is serious about the 
material reality and material effects of media.
The fields I have sketched are united in the effort to produce 
an adequate account of a progressive media-technological 
infra­(re­)structuring that weaves an ever denser web of 
interrelations between environment, technologies, and 
the social and psychological domains—a web, as I will try 
to show in the following, that is characterized by techno-
affective milieus and sensorily rewired sensations/motions 
(affections). Contemporary discourses on bio­atmospheric 
46 media technologies and the psycho-technical dimension 
of affection, however, tend to be ignorant of each other, 
which, in light of the interpenetration of environmental, 
physical, and affective sensory apparatuses and the con-
current and parallel cyberneticization of the somatic, 
psychological, and economic realms, indicates a failure to 
grasp the crucial point. These research fields must be con-
solidated under the aegis of Media Studies so that the zones 
of contact between the interior and exterior domains of 
sensing can be understood to be simultaneous processes 
of connection, disruption, and translation (as aspects of an 
expanded, post­human conception of affection). This under-
standing would also make clear that any implementation 
of the above mentioned entanglements and short circuits 
is never frictionless, uncontested, or untroubled by white 
noise. These moments of reversal—which are the sub-
ject of a joint research project I have launched with Birgit 
Schneider and Bernd Bösel (see 2016) —are central, 
undercutting both an exclusive focus on technology and a 
conventional anthropocentrism. For a vivid example, con-
sider the disempowerment experienced by the residents of 
so-called smart houses. The building’s sensors—those of 
its machines and architectures—and the sensory faculties 
of the inhabitants are cross-wired in complex ways that 
are prone (as in the case of undesired automatisms that 
cannot easily remedied) to disruption, or problems of 
translation may arise between technological and organic 
sensing. Similar considerations apply to settings beyond 
the domestic sphere: to sensor cities, GPS­controlled and 
satellite-monitored agricultural technology, or the collection 
of geographic and climate data. Each of these is liable to 
engender moments of reversal that merit investigation and 
may also be recognized and discussed in contemporary 
artistic practices. In particular, aesthetic productions lend 
themselves to an interrogation with a view to the potential 
for aisthetic differentiations that insist on the inversion as a 
radical in­translatability (of “sensing” and “sense­ability”).
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The animated film Inside Out, which premiered in Cannes in 
2015,3 tells the story of Riley, a pubescent girl who is given 
to emotional tantrums. It portrays her feelings starting with 
her birth, which marks the beginning of the evolution of 
her “emotion headquarters.” Joy is the first emotion, bound 
up with Riley’s storage of the earliest positive memories, 
followed by sadness, which triggers her first screaming 
fits. Soon enough, her life is ruled by five basic emotions: 
joy, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust. Joy makes Riley feel 
happy, fear safeguards her against accidents and injuries, 
anger fuels her sense of justice, and disgust lets her sense 
what might make her ill. The purpose of sadness, however, 
remains unclear. What is it good for? Does it counterbalance 
joy in order to maintain the sort of homeostasis also 
hypothesized by Freud? Perhaps. The film associates and in 
fact visualizes Silvan Tomkins’s model of affect, which is very 
much en vogue in Cultural Studies today. See, for example, 
the mixer console that serves to regulate Riley’s emotions. 
When the control knob is cranked up, she is agitated, 
aroused, abuzz; when it is turned down toward zero, her 
behavior is muted, even sad or depressed.
Perhaps entirely unintentionally, the film thus translates 
what I would argue are central elements of the con-
temporary debate over affect and emotions into a popular—
and quite traditional—visual language. The limitation 
to five basic emotions is noteworthy (chosen, the film-
makers argued, for simplicity’s sake): Tomkins, who, in the 
early 1960s, sought to develop a critical alternative to the 
psychoanalytical model of drive and libido, had compiled a 
list of nine basic affect pairs. Rediscovered in the early 1990s 
by the American queer theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 
his affect theory has become extraordinarily influential 
in Cultural and Media Studies and many other disciplines. 
3 Inside Out is a computer­animated film produced by Pixar, which 
has been a subsidiary of the Walt Disney Company since 2006 and is 
known for movies including Finding Nemo and Toy Story.
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acting as the central affect­regulation machine operated 
by the emotions is a wonderful visualization of Tomkins’s 
cybernetic­systems­theoretical conception of the affects. 
The strength of a signal determines whether an affect 
trends in a positive or negative direction. 
In the development of affective computing, which took off in 
the early 1990s, computer science has explicitly addressed 
itself to the problem of the utilization and algorithmic 
translation of affects. In the essay Total Affect Control, Or: 
Who’s Afraid of a Pleasing Little Sister? ([2015] 2016) Bernd 
Bösel and I have summarized the history, presuppositions, 
and implications of this development. Parisi describes 
affective computing as no more than an “extension of feeling” 
and offers no critical assessment. By contrast, we believe 
that it represents a very different kind of extension: the 
implementation, far beyond the domain of computation, of 
normalizations of affect that, under the guise of technical 
assistance, establish what they subject to calculation as the 
average and standard. 
In the field of affective sciences (cf. Davidson, Scherer, and 
Goldsmith 2003), affectivity is conceived as technological 
and thus capable of being manufactured in a way that 
goes far beyond all earlier psycho-technical approaches. 
Bösel and I use the terms “technologies of affect and 
psycho­technologies” (2015, 56) to subsume all the various 
technologies that are employed to gather, store, measure, 
categorize, catalogue, operationalize, simulate, and induce 
affective states. Phenomena that also merit mention 
in this context include affective gaming and surveillance 
technologies as well as certain applications of the 
quantified­self movement and life­tracking.
Yet the most ambitious promises in this direction have no 
doubt been made by the exponents of affective computing. 
A field that is high up on the current research agenda, it 
was put on the map by the computer scientist Rosalind 
Picard, whose 1997 visionary book Affective Computing first 
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recognizing and simulating affects. The reference model of 
affect in affective computing is the Tomkins­Ekman paradigm, 
an extension of the theory Tomkins, as mentioned above, 
developed in the 1960s as an alternative to psychoanalysis. 
Just as, in the Pixar animated film, Riley’s emotions operate 
the knobs of a mixer console to control her affects, 
Tomkins’s definition of affect was inspired by cybernetics 
and systems theory, two rising disciplines at the time. His 
model proposes gradated pairs of affects, which is to say, 
depending on an increasing or decreasing intensity of neural 
stimulation, the subject’s affect level will veer toward plus 
or minus. Surprise­startle demarcates the neutral affect 
spectrum, distress-anguish, anger-rage, fear-terror, shame-
humiliation, dissmell, and disgust are the negative affects, 
and interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy are positive. 
These affects, Tomkins argues, constitute the human being’s 
primary motivation system. Shame, he notes, is a central 
affect that is first brought into being by repression of inter-
est-excitement and enjoyment-joy and closely bound up 
with the visibility and especially the expressive capacity of 
the face.
The focus on affect inaugurates a shift away from an 
unconscious defined in psychoanalytic terms and toward 
consciousness that is subsequently completed by brain 
research—another discipline that emerges in the twentieth 
century—in the course of the century’s final third. In the 
twenty­first century, consciousness is widely regarded as 
the major research field; psychoanalysis has been sup-
planted by neurology and bio-cybernetics. As he began 
work on his model of affect, Tomkins already noted that 
the new interest in awareness and attention was closely 
associated with the developments of automata creators: 
automatic machines, feedback engines that have by now 
begun to resemble the human being in disconcerting ways. 
Yet, as he went on to remark, it was 
50 not just consciousness in general which has been 
neglected, but the role of affect has also been 
grossly underestimated. … We might speculate that 
the phenomena of consciousness might possibly 
never have been so neglected had the problem been 
restricted to determining what another human being 
thinks. It is rather knowing how he feels that has been 
most strikingly avoided. (Tomkins 2008, vol. 1, 4) 
By asserting the centrality of the face, and hence of the 
visibility of affects, Tomkins laid the groundwork for what 
would become the life’s work of his student Paul Ekman: 
the research—which, for decades, has harnessed the 
potential of media technologies—into the recognition and 
operationalization of facial expressions. Studying nonverbal 
behavior in the Fore society in Papua New Guinea, Ekman 
concluded that at least the basic affects were articulated by 
certain universal facial expressions, a finding that vindicated 
Charles Darwin. Existing cultural differences between the 
social “display rules,” (Ekman 2007, 4) he argued, hobbled 
recognition of the emotions felt by an individual, which 
could nonetheless be detected through an analysis of micro-
expressions. Since the rapid speed of these expressions 
defeated the untrained observer, the use of supporting 
media technology—first video, then computers— emerged 
as a crucial epistemic factor in the development of the Facial 
Action Coding System (FACS) that Ekman and his collaborator 
Wallace Friesen presented in 1978. It would become one of 
the cornerstones of affective computing.
As Picard observed, the Tomkins­Ekman paradigm was 
fundamental to the acknowledgment that emotions play a 
vital part in social life, and hence to the project of devel-
oping computer programs for the automated recognition 
of human emotions: “Today we know emotion is involved in 
rational decision-making and action selection, and in order 
to behave rationally in real life you need to have a properly 
functioning emotion system.” (2010, 12) The fact that Picard 
herself, in her role as a co-founder of the start-up Affectiva, 
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to market—the most recent product, Affdex, decodes 
facial expressions of customers—also demonstrates the 
increasingly close complicities between the worlds of 
technology, science, and business.4
An especially significant manifestation of this entan-
glement is the variously motivated ventures involving 
autistic persons. Not only have autistic individuals long 
been coveted as test subjects in the ongoing development 
of affective computing, they are also sought after as software 
developers, and moreover are one group of people who 
obviously, as the Canadian choreographer Erin Manning has 
put it, relate to their environment in a way that privileges 
the law of responsivity over that of signification (cf. 2009, 
95). In other words, efforts to work with autistic people are 
motivated by widely different interests. In Manning’s view, 
autistic individuals provide evidence that relations to reality 
are established and put into practice in a variety of ways. 
Meanwhile, software companies regard them as especially 
competent employees, for not entirely unrelated reasons. 
Discussing the autism activist Amanda Baggs, Manning 
emphasizes that the linguistic production of meaning is 
merely one way to communicate with the world and other 
people; a kind of physical responsivity would be another 
(245). Reading Baggs’s video In My Language,5 Manning 
enumerates the spectrum of affect, sensation, and object 
relation without devoting particular attention to the circum-
stance that Baggs uses her computer to spread her message 
in the online world. But, of course, technical interfaces not 
only enable autistic people to send messages to others, 
they also point up the fact that these individuals possess 
special skills—such as the ability to focus their attention to 
an unusual degree and uncanny pattern recognition—which 
4 The company’s homepage http://www.affectiva.com/technology/ 
explicitly mentions that the software is based on Ekman’s FACS.
5 See Baggs, Amanda. „In My Language“, Youtube video. Uploaded 
January 14, 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnylM1hI2jc.
52 the software industry is now quite openly trying to harness.6 
Moreover, autistic people are not only competent software 
fault analysts, they are also preferred test subjects in the 
ongoing research into affective stimuli and responses. It 
is not a coincidence that the Oxford Handbook of Affective 
Computing (2015) devotes considerable space to the ways 
in which computers may help autistic individuals achieve 
more nuanced emotional expression. Picard opens her con-
tribution with the story of a young autistic woman whom 
affective computing helps learn to exercise better control 
over her behavior in stressful situations (cf. 2015, 11–12).
Non-Consciousness and Emotional Self 
In a slim book titled What Should We Do with Our Brain? 
([2004] 2008) the French philosopher Catherine Malabou 
has introduced her conception of the plasticity of the brain 
into a debate that seeks to bring the humanities (back) up to 
par with brain research and negotiates the abdication of the 
epoché of écriture. Plasticity, as Malabou understands it, is a 
singular motif that provides a focused lens on the emerging 
and existing phenomena of a given period (indications 
of the contemporary). One might argue, Malabou writes, 
that plasticity will supplant écriture, the schema of the past 
epoch, prominently portrayed by authors from Roland 
Barthes to Jacques Derrida as the era of structures and 
language as the defining model of inscription (cf. Iveson 
2013). In his Mythologies ([1957] 1972) Barthes gave free reign 
to his enthusiasm for synthetic plastic, writing that, “more 
than a substance, plastic is the very idea of its infinite trans-
formation … less a thing than the trace of a movement.” 
(97) Even before Barthes, plasticity figured prominently in 
the French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon’s 
On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects ([1958] 2016). 
In Simondon, the plasticity of the machine is (still) distinct 
from that of the human brain: the former is a plasticity of 
6 See Spiegel Online. “Software–Konzern SAP stellt Hunderte Autisten 
ein,“ May 21, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/
sap–stellt–bis–2020–hunderte–autisten–ein–a–900882.html.
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content, which is to say, of the individual’s recollections. The 
form of the latter, Simondon emphasizes, is preserved: “The 
memory of the machine triumphs in the multiple and in dis-
array; human memory triumphs in the unity of forms and in 
order.” (122) This difference, he writes, is due to the fact that 
the machine lacks the plasticity of integration that is the 
vital aspect of human memory.
Human memory accumulates contents that possess a 
power of form in the sense that they overlap, gather 
in groups, as though the experience acquired served 
as the code for new acquisitions, interpreting and 
fixing them: content becomes coding, in man and, more 
generally, in living beings, whereas in the machine, 
coding and content remain separate as condition 
and what it conditions … Life is where the a posteriori 
becomes a priori; memory is the function through 
which a posterioris become a prioris. (123)
The term “synaptic plasticity” was first introduced to the 
neurosciences by the Canadian neurologist Donald Olding 
Hebb (cf. 1949). According to Hebb, the plasticity of synapses 
manifested itself in the ability of one neuron to support the 
action of another. Pierre Changeux has described such cou-
pling as “coactivation of … two cells [that] creates cooperation 
at the level of their contacts.” (1997, 142)
Even earlier, William James, in The Principles of Psychology 
(1890), had discussed plasticity, noting that “organic, 
especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with a very 
extraordinary degree of plasticity,” and so one of his most 
basic assumptions was “that the phenomena of habit in living 
beings are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which 
their bodies are composed” (64). The constant performance 
of life, then, either reinforces and deepens trajectories 
and tracks in the brain (pathways, traces) or carves new 
ones. Yet James’s views were largely disregarded for a long 
time; well into the twentieth century, researchers worked 
with the hypothesis that the brain ceased to grow and lost 
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individual reached adulthood. Nikolas Rose and Joelle Abi­
Rached have recounted this history of neglect, but then, 
as they emphasize, views shifted radically: “By the close of 
the twentieth century, the brain had come to be envisaged 
as mutable across the whole of life, open to environmental 
influences, damaged by insults, and nourished and even 
reshaped by stimulation—in a word plastic.” (2013, 48)
Malabou’s particular intervention is to introduce affect 
into this plasticity of the brain as the element stimulating 
a cerebral temporality that drives the development of an 
emotional self as the center of a new libidinal organization. 
“Within the brain,” she writes, “affect does not detach from 
itself; it does not deprive itself of its own energy” (2012, 
44). The brain, that is to say, is where affect comes into its 
own and forms the “core of subjectivity” (44). The latter, 
however, must not be mistaken for a new form of agency; 
it is sequence (in pure time), and as Malabou emphasizes, 
this core self should also not be identified as an ego or 
consciousness. On the contrary, it marks a radical temporal 
alienation. Once again, we encounter the kind of temporal 
dimension that played a part in Whitehead’s conception of 
blind feeling as well as in Massumi’s definition of affect.
The concept of self­ or auto­affection in the sense of a 
self­touching (without self) originates in Immanuel Kant, 
who framed this selfhood in temporal terms. In Heidegger, 
this time-bound self-referentiality then emerges as “the 
essential structure of subjectivity” (1990, 132). Time, he 
argues, is affected not by some being but by itself, and so 
change occurs at every moment of this self-referentiality, 
and subjecthood must be understood to be an exclusively 
retrospective alterity. In light of this philosophical back-
ground, the definition of self­affection as pure time and of 
the latter as the essential structure of subjectivity leads 
Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou to the question 
of whether we can think affect outside its fixation to the 
55self: “Can we think of affects outside autoaffection, affects 
without subjects, affects that do not affect ‘me’?” (2013, 6)
Affects, that is to say, organize themselves differently—in a 
political fashion, for example—and are transmitted in ways 
comparable to those that have been described for bacterial 
communities and sensory environments?

On Contingent (also) 
in the (Political) 
Encounter
The political sphere, in particular, has so far proven shiftless 
in the face of the novel import of processes of affection. 
Digital networks have yet to fulfill their promise to bring 
greater transparency to political processes, make it possible 
to address people directly, and enable them to exercise their 
democratic rights more easily and more effectively. In fact, 
the penetration of ever more domains of social life by digital 
networking technology illustrates that the latter brings 
neither transparency nor democratic processes but quite 
often the opposite: hatred, mobbing, lies, xenophobia—
these are the characteristic tenor not only of shitstorms. 
More and more people clamor for at least a temporary 
reprieve from the web and its encroachment upon their 
lives. The emphatic proclamation of “cultures of con-
nectivity” has given way to the disillusioned observation of a 
“connectivity against cultures,” (Cubitt 2016, 5) as Sean Cubitt 
put it in a lecture at the 2016 conference of the European 
Network for Cinema and Media Studies (NECS), alluding to 
the fact that ever more communication takes place among 
machines, programs, and algorithms, leaving a steadily 
diminishing role for human communication in decisions 
taken, for instance, in international financial markets or in 
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non-human “egos,” that is to say, have taken control of 
decision-making processes that were once regarded as the 
epitome of rationality, generating content that shapes the 
political and social spheres in ways that are neither open to 
scrutiny nor predictable.
In light of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s poststruc-
turalist theory of democracy, Oliver Marchart, who has 
analyzed society as the “impossible object,” has proposed 
an affectology on the basis of an ontological antagonism as 
the necessary next step after Laclau and Mouffe’s works 
on populism (cf. 2013, 437). The development of such an 
affectology, he argues, is required if we hope to understand 
and practice politics today. Years ago, Brian Massumi called 
for a politics more attuned to affect, one that would “meet 
affective modulation with affective modulation” (Massumi 
and Zournazi 2003, 26). He went on to emphasize that this 
inevitably implied a more theatrical and aesthetic per-
spective on politics, which needed to proactively adapt 
to a performative shift that forced it to defend its stakes 
by different means. Despite the differences of idiom and 
theoretical background, Marchart’s call for an affectology 
bears striking resemblance to Massumi’s ideas.1 That 
becomes apparent when Marchart translates the term 
“antagonism” as “intensity”: the ontological antagonism, he 
writes, must be understood to be intensity—an interesting 
move, in more than one regard.
1 In recent years, Chantal Mouffe, too, has repeatedly referred 
to affects, though invariably describing them as the opposite 
of cognition. Affection, in other words, figures in her work as a 
foundation or undertone that informs the emergence of political 
identities: “This is why the transformation of political identities can 
never result from a rationalist appeal to the true interest of the 
subject, but rather from the inscription of the social agent in a set 
of practices that will mobilize its affects in a way that disarticulates 
the framework in which the dominant process of identification takes 
place.” (Mouffe 2013, 93)
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Autonomy of Affect (1996), this has been one widely accepted 
definition of affect: affect is intensity that belongs to a 
different order. On the other hand, when it comes to the 
question of affect, Laclau’s theory is decidedly informed 
by the Lacanian conception, which is unequivocal: affect 
cannot be perceived or analyzed as such, and so of course 
also cannot be operationalized for political purposes.2
How, then, can we think affect as both intensity and antag-
onism? And think it, moreover, as an ontological premise, 
allowing us to put a name on modulations beyond their 
scalability? As Marchart writes, such modulations would 
range “from the revolution to the quarrel over domestic 
chores, from the general strike to skiving … Antagonism 
… cannot be quantified; it can only be experienced in its 
intensity, or more precisely, as intensity” (2013, 437). Political 
affects, Marchart goes on to argue, are not aroused by 
interpellation but by an “encounter with the antagonism … 
that belongs to the register of the real” (443). This, then, is 
where Laclau’s and Jacques Lacan’s theories intersect. Yet 
if, as Marchart underlines, the feeling of outrage and the 
affect of outrage are “miles” (443, n. 18) apart, we may well 
conclude that there is another plane that is prior even to the 
concept of antagonism: the plane of dislocation introduced 
by Laclau in his New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time 
(1990). This always­already­precedent dislocation is where 
his thinking enters a conjunction with the (Lacanian) real 
and, perhaps, with the zone of the affective. Both the real 
and dislocation are “unrepresentable and at once traumatic/
disruptive and productive” (Stavrakakis 1998, 185). Therein 
lies a possible link to the affective, though not on the level, 
as Marchart writes, of the antagonism (which always already 
2 “The affective bond becomes more central whenever the … symbolic 
dimension of language operates less automatically. From this per-
spective, affect is absolutely crucial in explaining the operation of 
the substitutive/ paradigmatic pole of language, which is more freely 
associative in its working (and thus more open to psychoanalytic 
exploration).” (Laclau 2005, 227)
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level of dislocation. The difference between affect and 
feeling mentioned above can be located, in Lacanian terms, 
between the symbolic/imaginary order and the real (of 
affect).
Media play an amplifying rather than a constitutive role in 
Marchart’s conception; they are transmitters that connect 
the bodies in the streets to the bodies in front of TV and 
cell-phone screens. The question that remains unresolved, 
however, is how this encounter with the real (of affect)—the 
genuine moment of reversal or inversion—can prompt a 
motion that turns one body into many bodies whose rhythm 
carries the individual body along: for that moment is not, as 
Marchart writes, an unfolding (in the sense of the Deleuzian 
fold) of the “trembling self” (2013, 437) into the social sphere, 
but the movement toward a radical ego-lessness that gives 
the bodies over to their affective­technological modulations.
I have traced this ego- or subjectlessness of sentient bodies 
in theorists from Diderot across Whitehead to Massumi in 
order to introduce it as a prerequisite for, or effect of, (new) 
intensive milieus. Can the concepts of antagonism and dis-
location help us understand this point better?
Let us briefly recall the three operations of the affective—as 
connective, disruptive, and translative; as the temporally 
barred momentum of a relation, a blank, a gaping opening. 
Auto­affection, in this context, is the first inscription of a 
movement as the opening of such an interval. Dislocation as 
original displacement is then comparable to the movement 
Derrida called différance—that which makes a system defy 
closure, its necessary openness, the setting-itself-in-motion 
of life (remember Diderot’s description of the hatching 
chick). The antagonism, however, gestures toward the 
accidental, the un-expectable, the unforeseen.
Surprising support for this conjunction comes from none 
other than Louis Althusser, whose definition of ideology as 
interpellation was always a foundational text for Laclau. 
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the Materialism of the Encounter ([1994] 2006) with rain. 
Taking up Malebranche’s question—why does rain fall 
into the sea when there is enough water there as it is, 
so that the rain does not add anything to it?—Althusser 
undertakes an inquiry into the rain that, he writes, has 
been ignored throughout the history of philosophy, and 
sketches a “‘materialism ’ (we shall have to have some word 
to distinguish it as a tendency) of the rain, the swerve, the 
encounter, the take [prise]” (167). To put this repressed 
tradition in philosophical history on the table, to say, this is 
what is at stake, who will touch it, Althusser then challenges 
us to think the “fact of the subordination of necessity to 
contingency, and the fact of the forms which ‘gives form’ to 
the effect of the encounter” (170). In other words, Lucretius’s 
atoms—a rain; Spinoza’s infinite attributes—they, too, 
a rain: all these, as Althusser emphatically notes, point 
toward a repressed materialism that awaits reactivation. I 
should note, however: reactivation not in the sense of an 
affirmative relationality that strives to emplace everything 
in an encompassing structure promising salvation. Rather, 
a materialism that places contingency at the center, the 
accidental of the encounter and the necessity of taking 
and being-taken. Similarly, Haraway, adopting Whitehead’s 
concept of prehension or appropriation in her Companion 
Species Manifesto (2003), translates it with the verb “to grasp”. 
A prehension of this sort, an appropriation, can be con-
ceived of as a coalescence of interrelations, which is to say, 
everything comes into being in an act of mutual taking or 
grasping. Haraway adds: “Prehensions have consequences. 
The world is a knot in motion … There are no pre-con-
stituted subjects and objects, and no single sources, unitary 
actors, or final ends.” (6) The world as a knot in motion—
Laclau speaks of nodes brought into being by antagonistic 
articulations—rests on a “there is” (Althusser 2006, 170). 
Directed against any purpose, against any totality, this 
underground current of the encounter seizes the not-yet-
subjects to incorporate them into itself, to lend them a form 
62 and submit them to a law. Yet the latter, too, is not pre-
determined but an element in an aleatory series.
The radical emphasis on the accidental quality of the 
encounter in Althusser, the emphasis on the articulation of 
contingency in Laclau, antagonism as intensity in Marchart, 
the conjunction of dislocation and the real—taken together, 
these allow us to outline an understanding of affect that is 
most urgently needed today: if, amid the current transfor-
mation of technology, life, and environment, we are not to 
forfeit accident, contingency, that momentum of deviation, 
the clinamen that, for brief instants, lets the rain slip and 
shift out of its trajectories.
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